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On the 2nd of March 2005 over one-hundred countries, as well as representative from the World Bank, 
the Regional Development Banks (RDBs), and the OECD Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) committed themselves “to a practical blueprint to provide aid in more streamlined ways that 
better meet the needs of developing countries”iii by issuing the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: 
Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and mutual Accountabilityiv 
The Declaration has some 50 commitments by both OECD (‘donor’) and developing (‘partner’) 
countries to improve the quality and effectiveness of Official Development Assistance (ODA), mainly 
through ‘mainstreaming’ ODA into domestic development strategies. And the key message of the 
Declaration is that this can only be done if the recipient partner countries can exercise genuine 
ownership over the process. Among the only two people mentioned in the press release on the 
Declaration was then World Bank president James Wolfensohn, who was quoted as having said that 
“we know what needs to be done. With the Paris Declaration, we have the blueprint to do it.” 
Three years later, the World Bank – together with the RDBs – has begun a process of consultation to 
establish a ‘portfolio of strategic Climate Investment Funds [CIFs]. The overall objectives of the 
funds will be to provide concessional finance for policy reforms and investments that achieve 
development goals through a transition to a low carbon development path and climate-resilient 
economy’v 
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The proposed portfolio is initially meant to include three new investment funds: a Clean Technology 
Fund (Target size US$5-10bn); a $1bn Forest Investment Fund, and a $1bn Adaptation Pilot Fund, to 
be replenished either directly or through another new ‘transformation’ fund. Among the aims of the 
CIFs is to ‘pilot innovative approaches and ideas … through learning-by-doing that could inform and 
support a successful outcome to the post-2012 framework negotiations. 
Notwithstanding the fact that most developing countries would reject the idea that the post-2012 
deliberations are ‘framework negotiations’ – for them, the framework is, and is meant to remain, the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change – this World Bank initiative would seem to be very 
much in line with the thinking of many of the envisaged recipient countries of these funds. After all, 
‘learning-by-doing’ activities has been a long standing demand of most developing countries, 
particularly in the context of the Clean Development Mechanism and the Nairobi work programme on 
impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change.vi  
This initiative could, in particular, be the beginning of the long-awaited serious collaboration between 
developed and developing countries to fight climate change though new and additional funding in the 
spirit of Art 4.7 of the Convention as reflected in the twin-aims of Para. 1.b.ii of the Bali Road Map of 
combining measurable, reportable, and verifiable mitigation actions by developing countries with 
measurable, reportable, and verifiable financing and technology transfer from developed ones. 
Both the Paris declaration and the WB initiative are ultimately aimed at mainstreaming certain 
policies in developing countries. The rationales put forward for all three CIFs are quite explicit on 
this: 
Clean Technology Fund: “There is a gap in the international ODA architecture for finance to 
developing countries at more concessional rates than the standard MDB terms and at the scale 
necessary to help provide them incentives to integrate low-carbon strategies into their 




Forest Investment Fund “mitigation and adaptation strategies need to become an integral part of 
national forest policies and international efforts addressing climate change” 
Adaptation Pilot Fund: “We need to transform the way adaptation is approached and financed in 
developing countries, from being a standalone issue to being one which is fully integrated with 
core development planning and budgeting.” 
The problem, in our opinion is that the World Bank tries to do so with complete disregard of the 
lessons reflected in the Paris Declaration. This is not only apparent in what does come across as a 
somewhat paternalistic tone in the blueprint (‘We need to transform … developing countries’) but 
much more seriously in the proposed governance structure for the CIFs. We feel that the many 
elements of the blueprint which are worthy of success will be unnecessarily doomed to failure if these 
governance shortcomings are not rectified speedily and whole-heartedly. 
Indeed, our fears are grounded not just in our belief that the spirit of the Paris Declaration – with its 
emphasis on partnership and mutual ownership of the process – is the only way to achieve the desired 
mainstreaming of ODA, but in the fact that the sort of climate change funding envisaged by the World 
Banks funds are generally not considered to be ODA. They are meant to be additional to ODA, 
reflecting the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. Accordingly, many, if not most 
developing countries, regard themselves as entitled to receive this sort of assistance, which is why it is 
even more important than in the case of ODA that they should take ownership of the respective 
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funding processes. As a matter of fact, the recently completed negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Adaptation Fund are a good example of what can happen in the context of climate change financing 
when this ownership is missing. 
One step forward … 
The Adaptation Fund is based on a levy on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) established 
under the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. However, the negotiations of how this fund was to be 
operationalised and governed had to wait until the first Session of Kyoto Protocol governing body 
(CMP.1vii) in Montreal, after the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, by which time two 
other funds had been created (2000) under the financial mechanism of the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, both operated by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), located in Washington 
as it was originally “established in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD 
or World Bank) as a pilot program in order to assist in the protection of the global environment”viii. 
At Montreal, many (particularly industrialised) countries thought that the most natural candidate for 
running the AF would again be the GEF, given its track record and a reluctance to proliferate 
organisational entities. And yet, it was that track record, particularly with respect to the two 
Convention funds, which in the eyes of many developing countries was not satisfactory, that led the 
debate on operationalising the AF to be a debate on the merits and demerits of the GEF and its 
governance structure. 
Many developing countries felt very little if any ownership over the GEF, which they saw as 
dominated by donor concerns, and disregarding guidance by the UNFCCC Conference of Parties 
(COP). This dissatisfaction led, in a first instance, to the rather unusual revision of a decision by the 
CMP at its second meeting in Nairobi which was only adopted at the preceding Montreal session, 
namely the explicit inclusion or the requirement that the AF should be under the ‘authority’ of the 
CMP, in addition to the traditional ‘being under the guidance of and accountable to’. The Nairobi 
decision also adopted “a one-country-one-vote” rule and a majority representation for developing 
countries on the governing body.ix This was a fundamental departure from the previous arrangements 
for climate change funds, where donors − due to the GEF mixed voting system − had an implicit 
veto.x  
At the most recent Session of the CMP in Bali/Indonesia (November 2007), this dissatisfaction was 
re-confirmed, not least in a Statement by Marthinus Van Schalkwyk, the Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism of South Africa, who led the AF negotiations on behalf of the G77+China: 
“Our cabinet mandate was to establish a transparent and fair governance regime under an Adaptation Fund 
Board […] Our aim was also to ensure that this fund will be exempt from the decision-making procedures of the 
GEF, to give developing countries a more direct and equitable voice in how funds are prioritised and spent.  
The possibility of direct access to the Adaptation Fund by eligible parties was of major concern for the 
Group of 77. The G77 did not want to continue a process where they would be forced to use implementing 
agencies. After agreeing to include criteria relating to financial responsibility and the ability to deliver the 
projects, it was agreed that eligible countries will have direct access to the Fund.  
The appointment of a secretariat and trustee was of the most contentious aspects of the decision, given the 
negative experiences that most developing countries have with their interaction with the GEF and the World 
Bank in respect of the funding of climate related projects.” 
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In the end, the CMP actually did decide in Bali to create a completely new operating entity − in 
addition to the GEF − called the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB), with a majority of 
members/alternates from developing countries, and designated representation from the two main 
recipient interest groups, the Group of Least Developed Countries, and the Alliance of Small Island 
States. Moreover, it was decided that Parties should have direct access, and the involvement of the 
GEF and the World Bank in the running of the AF was reduced to an interim provision of secretariat 
and trustee services, respectively. Indeed, to avoid any possible confusion with the other operating 
entity of the UN financial mechanisms for climate change, it was also decided that AFB is to meet at 
the seat of the UNFCCC Secretariat in Bonn/Germany. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the assessment of Minister Van Schalkwyk of the Bali Adaptation Fund 
Decision: “The decision constitutes a major victory for the developing world in setting in place a new 
governance system for funding of adaptation activities.” What is surprising is that news of this does 
not seem to have reached 1818 H Street in Washington (headquarters of both the World Bank and the 
GEF). 
… two steps back? 
One, if not the key problem with the current blueprint for the World Bank Climate Investment Funds 
− not only from a developing country perspective − is the proposed governance structure, which 
makes that of the GEF look positively progressive.xi Indeed, compared to that of the Adaptation Fund, 
it is a huge leap backwards. 
According to the 22 January version of the blueprint, each investment fund would have an 
independent governance structure which has ultimate control over that fund [§6]. The governance of 
each fund would be exercised through a dedicated Trust Fund Committee (TFC), comprised of donors 
to the particular fund, who decide on who will represent them [§§6, 17]. § 17 also posits a minimum 
contribution, the level of which is “to be decided”, meaning that small donor countries could well be 
kept out of the governance of the funds.  
The envisaged interaction with recipients and stakeholders is described [§11] as the possibility that 
“donors of all funds could convene an annual outreach forum to bring together donors, recipients and 
stakeholders. The outreach forum would provide an opportunity to exchange views on policy issues 
affecting the investment funds and other activities.” In other words, developing countries and NGO, if 
they are lucky, might get invited once a year to find out what is going on. 
The remaining articles on how these CIFs would be governed/managed begin with the proposal that 
the World Bank would host a secretariat for these funds [§12], and that it would serve as the trustee 
[§13]. Decision making would essentially be by consensus [§18], that the TFCs “would meet at a 
senior level once or twice a year, depending on business needs”[§20]. Towards the end, the blueprint 
discusses the fees for the Secretariat and the Trustee (to be “based on cost rather than a percentage of 
the resources held in the fund” [§28], before turning to ‘issues that will require further elaboration’ 
[§29]. The third issue listed − just after “(ii) who should Chair the meetings of the Trust Fund 
Committee?” is: 
“(iii) who would be invited as observers to the Trust Fund Committee? Voice of 
recipient countries in the governance structure?” 
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It should be encouraging to see that the issue of giving the recipient countries a voice in the 
governance structure of these new World Bank funds is still seen as requiring further elaboration, 
although the signs that this will be given the prominence needed for this initiative to succeed are 
unfortunately not auspicious. 
Will the World Bank, or rather the key donors thus far consulted (Japan, UK, US) be able and willing 
to leap forward in their proposal for the governance of the envisaged funds by including developing 
countries as equal partners in the spirit of the OECD Paris Declaration?  
We are not asking the World Bank and the other initiators of this potentially valuable initiative to 
perform a ‘great leap forward’ – all we hope is that there is still time to prevent a leap in the opposite 
direction that would be unhelpful to absolutely everybody. After all it stands to reason that the 
funding channelled through these funds, particularly the Clean Technology Fund, will benefit their 
own industries at least as much as they will benefit the participating developing countries. 
In particular, will the UK and Japan, and perhaps even the US under a new administration, be able to 
embrace the partnership that has been established in the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund? For one, 
the overall rationale for the proposed CIF Adaptation Pilot Fund − namely to integrate adaptation as 
‘an integral part of national and sectoral development plans’ − is not incompatible with the remit of 
the Adaptation Fund, but could easily be integrated as a ‘Policy Adaptation Programme,’ particularly 
if donors are willing to fund these sorts of activities.  As such it would complement the project based 
activities of the Adaptation Fund funded through the CDEM levy, thus enabling it to take a truly 360º 
view of adaptation. 
The question is therefore whether the donor community is willing to provide the start-up money for 
such a Programme under the Adaptation Fund? Or will they choose to further erode trust by 
contributing to an unnecessary proliferation of adaptation funds under a governance structure wholly 
unacceptable to the large majority of countries in the world? 
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